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Abstract
In this article, we introduce a new concept of oblivious transfer with membership verification that allows any legitimate
group users to obtain services from a service provider in an oblivious manner. We present two oblivious transfer with
membership verification schemes, differing in design. In the first scheme, a trusted group manager issues credentials for
a pre-determined group of users so that the group of users with a valid group credential can obtain services from the
service provider, while the choices made by group users remain oblivious to the service provider. The second scheme
avoids the trusted group manager, which allows any user in the group to be a group manager, thus it is more suitable in
distributed systems. In particular, we prove that the two oblivious transfer with membership verification schemes can
achieve receiver’s privacy and sender’s privacy under a half-simulation model.
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Introduction
It is a well-known economic strategy that the service
providers are usually willing to sell their goods or ser-
vices to a group of users with a discount price to attract
customers. The more people who make a batch buy, the
better prices the service providers are willing to offer. In
addition to a good price, the customer’s privacy should
be protected when buying goods or services from the
service providers. With this motivation in mind, we aim
to design oblivious transfer with membership verifica-
tion schemes (MV-OT), which ensure that (1) user’s pri-
vacy (e.g. consumption transcript) is hidden from the
service provider, (2) only legitimate group users can
obtain services from the service provider, and (3) the
proposed MV-OT schemes should incur same computa-
tion and communication costs as conventional obliv-
ious transfer with access control schemes.
To see whether MV-OT is useful in practice, we con-
sider a scenario where an issuer (group manager) forms
a group which includes certain number of users wanting
to purchase digital goods or services from a service
provider. After forming a group of users, the issuer first
generates the group credential for all users. Next, the
issuer registers the group with a service provider, who
will verify whether the real number of users in the group
is in accordance with the claimed number. After a suc-
cessful authentication with the service provider, a valid
group user can acquire the digital goods or services
obliviously.
We stress that designing MV-OT schemes is a non-
trivial task. The straightforward way to achieve MV-
OT is to combine a broadcast encryption or a member-
ship encryption scheme with a conventional oblivious
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transfer with access control scheme.1,2 The group man-
ager first encrypts the credential and broadcasts the
ciphertext to every user in the group, only valid users in
the group could obtain the credential, with which the
users in the group could acquire services from a sender.
However, there are several drawbacks in this straight-
forward combination. First, the combined algorithm
inherits the computation and storage costs of two inde-
pendent algorithms. Second, every user in the group
has to share the same credential, which means if a dis-
pute happens, even the group manager cannot decide
which user should be accused. Third, a straightforward
combination of two different algorithms may lead to
new security issues.
Our contributions
We formulate the concept of MV-OT and present two
concrete MV-OT schemes that can be applied in differ-
ent applications. In the first scheme, a central authority
first forms a group of users willing to make a batch buy
from a service provider (or sender). The central author-
ity generates credentials for group users and group
token which is sent to the sender. The sender encrypts
the digital contends with the group token to ensure
only group users with valid credentials can acquire the
digital goods or services successfully. The users outside
the group cannot gain any information transmitted
between the sender and the valid users in the group. In
the second scheme, we remove the central authority to
make it much more suitable in distributed applications.
Any member in the group or even the sender can play
the role of an issuer to generate group information.
It is worth noticing that the proposed schemes
achieve privacy as well as membership verification
without involving too much computation and commu-
nication costs. The comprehensive efficiency analysis of
the proposed schemes shows that our proposed schemes
just involve few extra computation and communica-
tion costs compared with the oblivious transfer with
access control schemes in Han et al.,1 which makes the
proposed MV-OT schemes applicable in many distribu-
ted systems such as ad hoc mobile networks.
Related works
Oblivious transfer. Oblivious transfer has been applied
widely in secure multiparty computation,3 digital con-
tent browsing,4 exchange of secrets5 and other privacy-
preserving systems.1,2,6,7 Oblivious transfer has received
much attention since it was first proposed by Rabin.5
In the early works,5,8 the sender can only one message
mb, b2f0, 1g obliviously, which was soon extended to a
more general k-out-of-n setting by Brassard et al.,9
where a receiver could choose k messages obliviously
from a sender. To ensure only legitimate receivers
obtain contents from a receiver, Coull et al.10 proposed
an oblivious transfer scheme with access control using
state graphs, where the receivers in the system can only
acquire contents successfully from a sender if he has
some unused states. Liu et al.11 proposed the concept
of traceable oblivious transfer such that the privacy of
users is treated separately. The privacy of the honest
receivers is well-protected while the privacy of the dis-
honest receivers could be traced by the sender.
Broadcast encryption. The concept of broadcast encryp-
tion was proposed by Fiat and Naor.12 Broadcast
encryption enables one broadcaster to transmit mes-
sages to a dynamically chosen group of users S such
that S  N , where N refers to the set of all the users
having access to the broadcast channel. Fiat and
Naor12 presented the first symmetric-key-based broad-
cast encryption scheme and the corresponding security
model, which was extended to the public key setting by
Dodis and Fazio.13 Recently, Gritti et al.14 proposed a
novel broadcast encryption with dealership scheme
which enables certain ‘‘dealers’’ in the broadcast system
first to make a bulk buy from the broadcaster and then
resell them in their own groups. Broadcast encryption
with dealership accommodates a new business opportu-
nity model and has received lots of attention.15,16
Broadcast encryption can provide group membership
verification; however, the ‘‘dealer’’ can trace the con-
tents purchased by the users in the group, which in turn
violates the privacy requirements in the aforementioned
scenario.
Membership proof and membership encryption.
Membership proof17–20 is a very useful cryptographic
primitive such that a user can prove to a verifier in a
privacy-preserving manner that an attribute A belongs
to a group G. Membership proof protocols can be fur-
ther divided into two categories according to the infor-
mation that can be accessed by the verifier. In the first
category,19,20 the verifier has knowledge of a token
P(A) on a single attribute and all the attributes in 1G.
The prover can convince the verifier that A 2 G with-
out letting the verifier know which attribute it is in the
group. In the second category,17,18 the verifier has
access to an attribute A and the group token P(G) con-
taining information on a set of attributes. The prover
can convince the verifier that A 2 P(G) without leaking
information of other attributes in the group.
Membership encryption is proposed by Guo et al.21,22
as a useful alternative primitive of membership proof.
It employs the privacy-preserving group token P(G) in
Au et al.17 such that given P(G), it is computationally
difficult to know the attributes or identities in P(G);
however, a success decryption requires that a user holds
the membership A 2 G.
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Secret handshake. Secret handshake23–25 is a useful pri-
mitive that can be applied in privacy-preserving appli-
cations where group membership verification is
indispensable. The concept of secret handshake was
introduced by Balfanz et al.,23 which enables some enti-
ties in the same group to authenticate each other anon-
ymously without leaking private information. Later on,
Xu and Yung24 proposed a secret handshake scheme
achieving k-unlikability, which means an adversary can
only infer that the participant is one out of the k users
in the group. Recently, Tian et al.25 proposed a k-time
secret handshake scheme that allows valid users in a
group to authenticate each other up to k times with a
group credential. Otherwise, the private information
can be traced in public. To achieve group membership
verification, secret handshake schemes require that the
service provider has to stay within the same group with
all the users, which is impractical for the setting men-
tioned in the aforementioned scenario.
Article organization. The rest of the article is organized as
follows. We introduce the formal definition and the
security model of MV-OT in section ‘‘Security model.’’
Some preliminaries are presented in section
‘‘Preliminaries,’’ and concrete MV-OT schemes are pre-
sented in section ‘‘Our proposed schemes.’’ We prove
their security and analyze their efficiency in section
‘‘Security analysis,’’ and the article is concluded in sec-
tion ‘‘Conclusion.’’
Security model
In this section, we present the formal definition and the
security model for MV-OT schemes.
Definition
There are three entities in an MV-OT system, namely, a
receiver, a sender, and an issuer who behaves on behalf
of a group manager. We assume there exists a public
key infrastructure (PKI) that issues certificates on users’
public keys. First, the issuer forms a group containing
the users willing to obtain services from the sender.
Then, the issuer generates the group token and sends it
to the sender via a secure channel. The issuer generates
credentials for each user in the group, with which the
user (i.e. the receiver) could obtain services or digital
goods from the sender. The system consists of four
algorithms as follows:
1. Setup. Taking as input of a security parameter
k, the Setup algorithm outputs the system public
parameters params
params Setup(1k)
2. KeyGen. Taking as input of the system parameters
params, the KeyGen generates the public key pairs
for the senders, receivers, and issuer, respectively,
in the system
(pkI , skI ) KeyGen(params)
3. GroupGen. Taking as input of the systems para-
meters params, pseudonyms of l users
A1,A2, . . . ,Al, and the private key of the issuer, it
returns the credential for the receivers and group
token for the sender
si  GroupGen(skI ,Ai; params), 1 ł i ł l
P(G) GroupGen(skI ,A1,A2, . . . ,Al; params)
4. Commitment. Taking as input of the group token
P(G) and the system parameter params, the
Commitment algorithm outputs n ciphertexts
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) Commitment(P(G),
m1,m2, . . . ,mn; params)
5. Transfer. The polynomial probabilistic time algo-
rithm Transfer is an interactive algorithm between a
receiver Ai ( 2 R) and the sender S. The result of
this algorithm is that the receiver with pseudonym Ai
obtains the intended message while the sender S
records a transcript on Ai choice
Rij  TransferR(cij ,sij ; params)
Eij  TransferS(Rij ; params)
mij  TransferR(cij ,Eij ; params)
6. Correctness. We require that for any security
parameter k 2 N, if params Setup(1k),
(pkI , skI ) KeyGen(params), si  GroupGen
(skI ,Ai; params), 1 ł i ł l,
P(G) GroupGen(skI ,A1,A2, . . . ,Al; params),
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) Commitment(P(G),m1,m2, . . . ,
mn; params), Rij  TransferR(cij ,sij ; params), and
Eij  TransferS(Rij ; params), then the receiver
can obtain the intended message
mij  TransferR(cij ,Eij ; params)
Security model
The security model presented in this section follows the
half-simulation model in Naor and Pinkas.26 We define
that an MV-OT scheme is secure if the following condi-
tions hold:
1. Receiver’s privacy. The sender S cannot obtain
any information about the receiver’s choices.
To be specific, for any two different choice sets
Liu et al. 3
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2. Sender’s privacy. A valid receiver R cannot
obtain any information other messages
mi, i 62 fi1, i2, . . . , ikg other than the intended
contents. The security of the sender is defined
through the real-world/ideal-world paradigm.
In the real world, the sender and the receiver
execute the protocols following the algorithm.
In the ideal world, the protocol is executed with
a trusted third party (TTP). The sender sends
all the messages m1,m2, . . . ,mn to the TTP,
where the receiver acquires the intended choices
mi1 ,mi2 , . . . ,mik adaptively. If
fi1, i2, . . . , ikg  f1, 2, . . . , ng, then TTP sends
mi1 ,mi2 , . . . ,mik to the receiver. An MV-OT
scheme is said to provide the privacy of the sen-
der if for any receiver R in real world, there
exists a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) R0
such that the outputs of R and R0 are
indistinguishable.
3. Semantic security. If a receiver R does not have
a valid group credential si, 1 ł i ł l, she cannot




Let G1 and G2 be multiplicative cyclic groups with
prime order q. Let g and h be generators of G1. A
bilinear map e : G1 3G1 ! G2 satisfies the following
conditions:
 Bilinearity: e(ga, hb)= e(g, h)ab for all g, h 2 G1
and a, b 2 Gq.
 No-degeneracy: e(g, h) 6¼ IG2 , where IG2 is the
identity in G2.
 Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to
compute e(g, h) for all g, h 2 G1.
Complexity assumptions
Definition 1. Discrete logarithm (DL) assumption. Let G
be a cyclic group with a prime order q and g be a gen-
erator of G. Given a random element X 2 G, compute
x 2 Zp such that X = gx mod q. Let AdvDLA (k) be the
advantage of a PPT adversary. We say that DL
assumption holds in G that for all PPT adversary A,
the following function AdvDLA (k) is negligible
AdvDLA (k)=Pr½(gx =X , x 2 Zq) A(params, g,X ,G)
Definition 2. One-generator l-strong Diffie–Hellman (l-
SDH) assumption.27 Let (G1,G2) be a bilinear group,
for a randomly chosen element x 2 Zq and a random
generator g 2 G1, the l-SDH problem is, given
g, gx, gx
2
, . . . , gx
l 2 Gl + 11 , to compute a pair
(g1=(x+ c), c). Define the advantage of a PPT adversary
as AdvOGlSDHA (k), and we say the l-SDH assumption
holds if for all PPT algorithm A, the following function




c 2 Zq) A(params, g, gx, . . . , gx
l
)
Definition 3. Extended chosen-target computational
Diffie–Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption.1 Let G be a
cyclic group with prime order q and x 2 Zq, there is a
help oracle HG(  ) that takes gi as input and returns gxi .
Given a (k + 1) tuple fga1 , ga2 , . . . , gak + 1g, where
ai 2 zq for i= 1, 2, . . . , k + 1, define the advantage
AdvXCTCDHA (k) of a PPT adversary A, and XCT-CDH
assumption holds in G, if for all PPT adversary A that
AdvXCTCDHA (k) is negligible
AdvXCTCDHA (k)=Pr½gxak + 1
 AHG()(q, g, gx, gai1 , . . . , gaik )
where aij 2 fa1, a2, . . . , ak + 1g, for all j= 1, 2, . . . ,
k + 1.
Our proposed schemes
In this section, we present two MV-OT schemes. In the
first scheme, there is an issuer generating credentials
for the members in the group. Our construction takes
advantage of the techniques of accumulator scheme in
Nguyen.18 In the first proposed scheme, the system
parameters contain two secret keys (a,b) and some
auxiliary parameters ga, ga
2





, . . . , gba
l








membership verification process is described as follows:
1. If user Ai is a valid group user with credential
sAi = g
1
(a+Ai)(b+Ai ), then it would be computation-











which is further used to extract the intended message.
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2. Otherwise, if a dishonest user Ak who does not













which contains the inversion exponent g1=(a+Ak ) that is
computationally infeasible to be computed from the
system parameters.
MV-OT nk 3 1-I
The proposed scheme consists of a tuple of PPT algo-
rithms as follows:
1. Setup. Taking as input a security parameter k,
this algorithm outputs a bilinear group
(e,G1,G2) where e : G1 3G1 ! G2 and G1,G2
are cyclic groups with prime q. Let g be a gen-
erator of G1. The system parameters
params=(e,G1,G2, q, g).
2. KeyGen. Suppose there are l users with pseudo-
nyms A1,A2, . . . ,Al in the group, the issuer (i.e.
group manager) chooses a,b 2 Zq and com-
putes ga, ga
2
, . . . , ga
l
, gb, gba, gba
2
, . . . , gba
l
and









t 2Zq is chosen at random by the issuer. For
each user with pseudonym Ai,1ł ił l, the issuer
computes sAi =g
1=((a+Ai)(b+Ai)) and returns it to
the individual users. I sends (P(G),a) to the
sender S.
3. Commitment. in response to the requirement
from a user with pseudonym Ai, S chooses n dif-
ferent random elements t1, t2, . . . , tn 2 Zq and a
one-time secret z 2 Zq, S computes the cipher-











(a+Aj)  mj, S sends c1, c2, . . . ,
cn to Ai.
4. Transfer. Upon receiving the ciphertexts from
the sender, the receiver with pseudonym Ai
chooses ri 2 Zq and computes Bij = e(cij, 1,sAi),
Eij = e(cij, 1,sAi )
ri , where ij 2 f1, 2, . . . , ng, then
the receiver Ai sends Eij to S. S computes
Dij =(Eij)





and obtains the intended message
mij = cij, 2=Kij .
Correctness. Suppose the receiver with pseudonym Ai is
a valid group member with credential sAi . The correct-
ness check of MV-OT nk 3 1-II scheme is as follows



























































MV-OT nk 3 1-II
In the MV-OT nk 3 1-I scheme, it involves a central
authority named issuer helps to form and maintain the
group, which makes it unpractical in distributed scenar-
ios. Therefore, we proposed the second scheme MV-
OT nk 3 1-II without a central authority. Anyone who
tries to make a batch buy or even the sender could
behave as the group manager to initialize the system.
The proposed MV-OT nk 3 1-II scheme consists of a
tuple of PPT algorithms as follows:
1. Setup. Taking as input a security parameter k,
this algorithm outputs a bilinear group
(e,G1,G2) where e : G1 3G1 ! G2 and G1,G2
are cyclic groups with prime q. Let g and h be
generators of G1 and G2, respectively. The sys-
tem parameters params=(e,G1,G2, q, g, h).
2. KeyGen. Suppose there is an initial setup phase
and there have been l users with pseudonyms
A1,A2, . . . ,Al in the group. The sender chooses
a 2 Zq and computes ga, ga
2
, . . . , ga
l
and gener-




where t 2 Zq is randomly chosen by the sender.
For each user with pseudonym Ai, 1 ł i ł m, the
sender computes and returns sAi = g
1=(a+Ai).
3. Commitment. In response to the requirement
from a user with pseudonym Ai. S chooses n dif-
ferent random numbers t1, t2, . . . , tn 2 Zq and a
one-time secret z 2 Zq. S computes the
ciphertext of m1,m2, . . . ,mn as ci =(ci, 1, ci, 2)




(a+Aj) and ci, 2 =





(a+Aj)  mi. S sends c1, c2, . . . ,
cn to Ai.
4. Transfer. Upon receiving ciphertexts from the
sender, Ai chooses ri 2 Zq and computes
Bij = e(cij ,sAi ) and Eij =B
ri
ij
, where ij is the
index of message of the receiver’s choice and
ij 2 f1, 2, . . . , ng, then the receiver Ai sends Eij
to S. S computes Dij =(Eij)z and sends it to R.




and obtains the intended
message mij = cij, 2=Kij .
Correctness. Suppose the receiver with pseudonym Ai is
valid group member with credential sAi . The correct-
ness check of MV-OT nk 3 1-II scheme is as follows




















































The security result of our MV-OT schemes is shown by
the following theorems.
Theorem 1. The proposed MV-OT nk 3 1-I scheme pro-
vides receiver’s privacy for honest receivers.
Proof. Suppose an honest receiver with pseudonym Ai
requests contents from the sender. fEi1 ,Ei2 , . . . ,Eikg is
a set of transcripts on Ai choices. For any Eij such that










(a+Aj) 2 G2, then there exits r
0
i 2 Zq







i , where tiw 6¼ tij and
tiw 2 ft1, t2, . . . , tng, which means the choice of the
receiver is computationally indistinguishable to the sen-
der as long as the DL problem is hard in G2.
Theorem 2. The proposed MV-OT nk 3 1-I scheme pro-
vides sender’s privacy.
Proof. Suppose an honest receiver runs the MV-OT pro-
tocol with the sender S to obtain k messages. For any
PPT malicious receiver R̂ in the real world, we are able
to construct a PPT malicious receiver R̂ in the ideal
model such that the outputs of R̂ and R̂ are indistin-
guishable. R̂ simulates the honest sender S in the real
world and interacts with R̂ as follows:
1. S sends the messages m1,m2, . . . ,mn to the TTP.
2. R̂ sends c1, c2, . . . , cn to TTP such that
ci =(ci1 , ci2 ) 2 G1 3G2 for i= 1, 2, . . . , n,
where c1, c

2, . . . , c

n are n different pairs of ran-
dom numbers selected from G1 and G2 by R̂.
3. R̂ monitors the outputs of R̂, if R̂ can com-
pute Bi1 ,Bi2 , . . . ,Bik and Ei1 ,Ei2 , . . . ,Eik . R̂
chooses random Bi1 ,B

i2




, . . . , Eik 2 G2.
4. When R̂ requires Di1 ,Di2 , . . . ,Dik from
Ei1 ,Ei2 , . . . ,Eik , R̂ queries the help oracle
HG2 (  ) on Ei1 ,E

i2











1, 2, . . . , k.










6. R̂ outputs (Bi1 ,B

i2
, . . . ,Bik ,E

i1






2, . . . , c

n).
In the simulation process, if R̂ obtains k + 1 mes-
sages while R̂ is unaware of the indices of the corre-
sponding messages, the simulation aborts. Otherwise,
we are able to show that R̂ is only able to choose at
most k messages under the XCT-CDH assumption. If
R̂ can get k + 1 messages, he can compute Eij for

























which contradicts the XCT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, R̂ can only obtain the required messages
from the sender and cannot obtain any information on
other messages that he hasn’t required.
We can see from Theorem 1 that fBi1 ,Bi2 , . . . ,Bikg
and fEi1 ,Ei2 , . . . ,Eikg are indistinguishable from ran-
dom elements in G2 and fc1, c2, . . . , cng are indistin-
guishable from random elements in G1 3G2 by
Theorem 3. In addition, the sets of fDi1 ,Di2 , . . . ,Dikg




, . . . ,Dikg are identically distributed.
Therefore, no distinguishers can distinguish the outputs
of R̂ and R̂0 with a non-negligible probability.
Theorem 3. The proposed MV-OT nk 3 1 scheme is
semantic secure.
Proof. The semantic security of MV-OT nk 3 1-I is ana-
lyzed through two aspects. First, if the adversary A
could forge sAi = g
1=((b+Ai)(a+Ai)), then A could act as
authorized receiver to communicate with the sender. In
this case, there exists another PPT algorithm B that
could use A to break l-SDH assumption. Second, if the





the ciphertext ci =(ci, 1, ci, 2), then A could also obtain
messages from the receiver. In this case, there exists a
PPT algorithm that could take advantage of A to break
the XCT-CDH assumption. Therefore, MV-OT nk 3 1-I
is semantically secure.
Theorem 4. The proposed MV-OT nk 3 1-II scheme pro-
vides receiver’s privacy for honest receivers. The secu-
rity proof and the subsequent proofs of the MV-OT
n
k 3 1-II scheme are similar as that for MV-OT
n
k 3 1-I,
thus we omit it.
Theorem 5. The proposed MV-OT nk 3 1-II scheme pro-
vides sender’s privacy.
Theorem 6. The proposed MV-OT nk 3 1-II scheme is
semantic secure.
Efficiency analysis
We present a comprehensive complexity analysis in
terms of computation and communication costs. The
results are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. By
l, n, and k, we denote the number of users in the group,
the total number of the messages, and the number of
messages selected by a receiver. Let EG1 and EG2 denote
the exponential operations in G1 and G2, and P one
pairing operation.
Conclusion
In this article, we formulate the concept of MV-OT
such that only legitimate users with proper membership
can obliviously acquire digital goods or services from a
service provider. We have proposed two MV-OT
schemes with completed security analysis. The two
MV-OT schemes are different in design, and the one
without trusted group manager is preferable in distrib-
uted systems.
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